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COMMENT:
WHEN DUE PROCESS IS DUE: IMPLICATIONS OF
LOGERSTEDT V. TAYLOR AND THE SUPREME
COURT'S CONTRAVENTION OF THE RULES
OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE
Travis Dye* & Helia Jazayeri**
"Whatever disagreement there may be as to the scope of the phrase 'due
process of law,' there can be no doubt that it embraces the fundamental
conception of a fair trial, with opportunity to be heard."
-Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes'
I.

INTRODUCTION

The integrity of the appellate process depends on adherence to rules of
procedure promulgated by the Montana Supreme Court. The Montana Supreme Court requires litigants to act in accordance with the Appellate Rules
of Procedure, fulfilling its dual role as drafter and enforcer. The Rules facilitate the operation of the court system and ensure that attorneys and litigants participate in the legal system on equal footing.
This comment argues the Montana Supreme Court contravened its own
rules by issuing a writ of supervisory control in the case of Logerstedt v.
Taylor without allowing the opposing party to respond to the petition. 2 In
its zealous exercise of supervisory control, the Court violated its own Rules
of Appellate Procedure when it intervened in a case that in no way satisfied
the requirements for a writ. The Supreme Court granted the Petitioner relief
pursuant to its supervisory control powers.3 Under the facts of the case,
however, granting relief was not only a violation of the Rules of Appellate
Procedure, it was a surprising break from the Court's tradition of protecting
due-process rights.
Under Rule 14(3), the Supreme Court may issue a writ only upon a
finding that the district court has caused a gross injustice, the issues before
the Court are constitutionally significant on a statewide level, or the lower
* Travis Dye is a partner at Kalkstein, Johnson & Dye P.C., the firm that defended Dr. Clark
Taylor in Logerstedt v. Taylor.
** Helia Jazayeri is an associate attorney at Kalkstein, Johnson & Dye P.C. She was an intern at
the firm when it defended Dr. Clark Taylor in Logerstedt v. Taylor.
1. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 347 (1915) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
2. Or., Logerstedt v. Dist. Ct. of the 4th Jud. Dist. at 1-2 (Mont. Nov. 2, 2009) (No. OP 09-0587)
(Montana Supreme Court filings are available at Mont. Sup. Ct. Pub. View Docket, http://
supremecourtdocket.mt.gov, select Closed Case Search, search by case number OP 09-0587).
3. Id.at 2.
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court denied a substitution of judge in a criminal case and the party seeking
the writ does not have an adequate remedy on appeal. 4 The Supreme Court
made no such findings in Logerstedt and failed to discuss the Rule 14(3)
factors at all. Coupled with the Court's refusal to allow a response from the
party opposing the writ, the Court itself caused an injustice for which there
was no remedy.
This comment discusses the implications of a decision which essentially ignored the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Part II details the background and procedural history of Logerstedt. Part HI examines the due process concerns raised when the Court grants relief to one party without allowing the opposing party to respond. Part III also discusses the historical
purpose of the writ of supervisory control as a mechanism to safeguard due
process and examines the Montana Supreme Court's dual role as the drafter
and enforcer of the Appellate Rules of Procedure. Part IV explains why
granting a writ of supervisory control was inappropriate in Logerstedt. Part
V provides concluding remarks.
II.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Logerstedt was a medical-malpractice case that stemmed from a small
scar on the comer of Petitioner Logerstedt's mouth. Initially, Logerstedt
saw Dr. Taylor for treatment of an overbite condition. 5 Dr. Taylor performed oral surgery to reposition Logerstedt's jaw and successfully resolved the condition. The success of the surgery was never disputed.
Logerstedt filed suit alleging Dr. Taylor negligently "lacerated" his lip
during oral surgery. 6 Dr. Taylor's medical records stated, "[Djue to retraction, a separation of the right commissure of the mouth had [occurred]."
While each party disputed the other's characterization of the injury, it was
undisputed that the subject of the suit was a scar approximately one-and-a7
half centimeters long and two millimeters wide.
Approximately one year after Logerstedt filed suit, and over Dr. Taylor's objection, the district court granted Logerstedt's motion to amend his
complaint to add a claim for punitive damages. Logerstedt claimed Dr.
Taylor intentionally concealed the laceration and misrepresented its cause
to Logerstedt's mother. 8 After discovery closed, Dr. Taylor moved for par4. Mont. R. App. P. 14(3)(a)-(b).
5. Def.'s Br. Supporting Mot. in Limine, Logerstedt v. Taylor at 1 (4th Jud. Dist. Mont. Sept. 18,
2009) (No. DV 08-921) (copies of district court filings are on file with the Montana Law Review).
6. Compl., Logerstedt v. Taylor at 2 (July 23, 2008).
7. Def.'s Br. Supporting Mot. in Limine, Logerstedt v. Taylor at 2.
8. Amend. Compl., Logerstedt v. Taylor at 2 (June 30, 2009).
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tial summary judgment on the punitive damages claim.9 Dr. Taylor argued
there was no factual or legal basis for Logerstedt's claim for punitive damages because Logerstedt had not sustained any actual damages as a result of
the alleged concealment. After considering arguments from both parties,
the district court granted Dr. Taylor's motion for partial summary judgment, concluding that Logerstedt failed to establish that a genuine issue of
material fact existed to warrant presenting the claim for punitive damages to
the jury. 10
On October 30, 2009-six days before trial- Logerstedt filed an application for writ of supervisory control and stay of trial." Logerstedt
asked the Supreme Court to vacate the district court's order granting partial
12
summary judgment and permit him to allege punitive damages at trial.
On November 2, 2009, the Supreme Court exercised its supervisory control
powers and vacated the district court's order, thereby allowing Logerstedt
to proceed to trial with his claim for punitive damages. 13 Dr. Taylor immediately filed an emergency motion to vacate the Supreme Court's order,
arguing that Rule 14(7) requires the Supreme Court to give him an opportunity to respond. 14 The Supreme Court summarily denied Dr. Taylor's motion to vacate, without providing its reasoning. 15 In refusing to allow Dr.
Taylor the opportunity to respond, not only did the Supreme Court violate
Rules of Appellate Procedure 14(3) and 14(7),16 it also deprived Dr. Taylor
of his fundamental right to due process.
III.

DUE PROCESS

Article II, § 17 of the Montana Constitution provides that "[n]o person
shall be deprived of life, liberty, or health without due process of law." Due
process is defined as the conduct of legal proceedings according to rules
that protect private rights, including the right to a fair hearing before a tribunal with the power to decide the case. 17 Due-process violations pose a
9. Op. & Or. Granting Pl.'s Mot. to Amend Compl. & Or. Setting Tr. & Pretrial Conf., Logerstedt
v. Taylor at 1-6 (June 10, 2009) [hereinafter Op. & Or. Granting Pl.'s Mot. to Amend Compl.].
10. Op. & Or. Granting Def.'s Mot. for P.S.J. on Punitive Damages Claim & Denying as Moot
Def.'s Mot. for a Protective Or. Regarding Fin. Info. & Pl.'s Mot. to Compel Def's. Fin. Recs., Logerstedt v. Taylor at 5 (Oct. 29, 2009) [hereinafter Op. & Or. Granting Def.'s Mot. for P.S.J.].
11. Pl.'s Application for Writ of Supervisory Control & Stay of Jr. Tr., Logerstedt v. Dist. Ct. of the
4th Jud. Dist. at 8-9 (Oct. 30, 2009).
12. Id.
13. Or., Logerstedt v. Dist. Ct. of the 4th Jud. Dist. at 2.
14. Clark Taylor's Emerg. Mot. to Vacate Or. Granting Supervisory Control, Logerstedt v. Dist. Ct.
of the 4th Jud. Dist. at 1-2 (Nov. 2, 2009).
15. Or, Logerstedt v. Dist. Ct. of the 4th Jud. Dist. at 1.
16. Mont. R. App. P. 14(3) governs the writ of supervisory control; Mont. R. App. P. 14(7) governs
the procedural aspects of filing a writ of supervisory control.
17. Black's Law Dictionary 575 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 9th ed., West 2009).
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constitutional challenge for which the Montana Supreme Court has plenary
review.1 8 When the district court denies a litigant his due process, the litigant can appeal to the Supreme Court for recourse. Indeed, the Montana
Supreme Court has the duty and the power to remedy due process violations
and it does so routinely.
Given the nature of Montana's judiciary in terms of size and the absence of an intermediate appellate court, the Supreme Court is generally the
final protector of due process and other fundamental rights. The Supreme
Court's deprivation of a litigant's due process rights, therefore, is of particular concern since the injured party is left with no remedy or recourse at
law.
The very evolution of the writ of supervisory control is a product of
the Montana Supreme Court's tradition of safeguarding litigant due-process
rights. This unique mechanism protected parties during an era of rampant
corruption in Montana's judiciary. 19 This protection developed in a series
of Montana Supreme Court cases starting with State ex rel. Whiteside v.
District Court of First JudicialDistrict,20 and culminated with inclusion in
Montana's 1972 Constitution. 2 1
A.

The Creation of the Writ of Supervisory Control as a Safeguard
of Due Process

The Montana Supreme Court "has general supervisory control over all
other courts."'2 2 Montana's writ of supervisory control is a common-law
creation of the Supreme Court, declared in the 1990s, "to control the course
of litigation in the inferior courts."' 23 Designed as an extraordinary remedy
to combat corruption in the district courts, the writ provided a mechanism
that allowed the Supreme Court to intervene in the proceedings below to
ensure the integrity of the judicial system and to enforce a litigant's right to
24
present its case before a neutral body.
The writ is "extraordinary" because it permits the high court to interject in lower-court proceedings at any stage of the suit. Unlike other common-law writs, such as writs of mandamus, Montana's writ of supervisory
18, In re Baker, 194 P.3d 613, 614 (Mont. 2010).
19. For an in-depth historical analysis of the writ of supervisory control and writ practice in Montana, see Howell, infra n. 20.
20. Larry Howell, "Purely the Creatureof the Inventive Genius of the Court": State ex rel. Whiteside and the Creationand Evolution of the Montana Supreme Court's Unique and ControversialWrit of

Supervisory Control, 69 Mont. L. Rev 1, 4 (2008) (citing State ex rel. Whiteside v. Dist. Ct. of 1st Jud.
Dist., 63 P. 395, 400 (Mont. 1900)).
21. Mont. Const. art. VII, § 2(2).
22. Id
23. Howell, supra n. 21, at 4 (citing State ex rel. Whiteside, 63 P. at 400).
24. Id. at 4-5.
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control provides the Supreme Court unfettered access to the lower courts
and grants it authority to intervene whether or not the district court has
25
rendered a final judgment.
The 1972 Constitution bolstered the Court's authority for rule-making
and writ practice. Even though the Supreme Court has exercised its writ of
supervisory control powers for over a century under the common law, the
1972 Constitution specifically includes a provision that gives the Supreme
Court supervisory control over inferior courts. 2 6 The Court is now armed
with a constitutional mandate to "supervise" inferior courts. Indeed, the
writ does facilitate the operation of the court system because it affords the
Supreme Court a degree of flexibility necessary for it to effectively oversee
lower courts and interject when extraordinary issues arise, without having
to wait for the case to come before it on appeal from a final judgment.
The Court's expansion of writ practice in recent years, however, has
altered the purpose of the writ. Specifically, when the Court issues a writ in
cases without facts to satisfy the requisite gross injustice or other emergency factors required under Rule 14(3), it effectively minimizes the value
and the historical purpose of the writ- a last resort protection for litigants
who cannot receive adequate relief from an appeal.
B.

The Rules of Appellate Procedureand the Writ of
Supervisory Control

Montana's 1972 Constitution confers rule-making authority upon the
Montana Supreme Court. 27 The Montana Rules of Appellate Procedure
govern all legal proceedings before the Court.2 8 Because the rules apply
only at the appellate level, the Supreme Court is also the entity that enforces
the rules it drafted. Thus, not only does the Montana Supreme Court create
the rules that govern proceedings, it is also the sole entity that enforces
them.
Once the Supreme Court grants a petition for supervisory control pursuant to Rule of Appellate Procedure 14(3),29 it then exercises original jurisdiction over that particular issue.30 Rule 14(3) provides:
The Supreme Court has supervisory control over other courts and may, on a
case-by-case basis, supervise another court by way of a writ of supervisory
control. Supervisory control is an extraordinary remedy and is sometimes justified when urgency or emergency factors exist making the normal appeal
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. (citing State ex ret. Whiteside, 63 P. at 400).
Mont. Const. art. VII, § 2(2).
Mont. Const. art VII, § 2(3). The Legislature does, however, retain veto power over the rules.
Mont. R. App. P. 1(2).
Mont. R. App. P. 14(3) (formerly Mont. R. App. P 17(a)).
Mont. Const. art. VII, § 2(1).
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process inadequate, when the case involves purely legal questions, and when
one or more of the following circumstances exist:

(a) The other court is proceeding under a mistake of law and is causing a
gross injustice; or
(b) Constitutional issues of state-wide importance are involved; or
(c) The other court has granted or denied a motion for substitution of a
31
judge in a criminal case.

Appellate Rule of Procedure 14(7) outlines the procedural requirements associated with the writ of supervisory control: "Upon the filing of a
petition, the Supreme Court may order that a summary response be filed, or
'32
the Supreme Court may dismiss the petition without ordering a response.
The plain language of this rule is clear. Once a party files a petition for a
writ of supervisory control, the rule provides the Supreme Court only two
options. The Court may either (1) order a summary response (from the
opposing party) or (2) dismiss the petition. There is no third option or hybrid option that allows the Court to grant the petitioner relief without allowing the opposing party an opportunity to respond-as it did in Logerstedt. Indeed, nothing in Rule 14(3) permits the Supreme Court to grant
relief in a petition without giving the opposing side an opportunity to respond. Yet that is precisely what the Supreme Court did. In doing so, the
Court violated a clear rule that precludes the Court from granting supervisory control unless the opposing party has had an opportunity to respond.
The rationale behind Rule 14(7) is simple: the Supreme Court should
not take action that negatively affects a party without first hearing from that
party. The district court ruled against Logerstedt on the punitive damage
issue, but it did so only after extensive briefing and argument from both
sides. Contrarily, the Supreme Court, using its supervisory control powers,
reversed the district court but did so with an incomplete record that lacked
Dr. Taylor's arguments or briefing. Logerstedt included with his Petition
only his own prior briefing and the district court's orders. 33 In other words,
the Supreme Court had only Logerstedt's argument when it decided that the
district court had improperly granted summary judgment. The Court never
heard Dr. Taylor's "side of the story" before it reinstated a punitive-damages claim that had been dismissed by the district court. The Court's decision left Dr. Taylor less than two days to prepare to defend against a punitive damages claim at trial.
31. Mont. R. App. P. 14(3) (formerly Mont. R. App. P. 17(a)).
32. Mont. R. App. P. 14(7)(a).
33. Logerstedt's Petition contained the following six exhibits from Logerstedt v. Taylor (4th Jud.
Dist. Mont.) (No. DV 08-932): (A) Op. & Or. Granting Def.'s Mot. for P.S.J.; (B) Compl. & Demand
for Jury Tr.; (C) Op. & Or. Re: Pl.'s
Mot. to Amend Compl.; (D) Pl.'s
Br. Opp. Def.'s Mot. for S.J.
(Oct. 2, 2009); (E) Pl.'s
Br. in Opp. to Defs. Mot. in Limine (Sept. 9, 2009); (F) Or. Denying Def.'s
Mot. in Limine (Oct. 28, 2009) (copies on file with the Montana Law Review).
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The outcome in Logerstedt was not a necessary outcome. Though
Logerstedt filed his petition just days before trial, the Supreme Court's
hands were not tied. Had the Court believed Logerstedt's petition potentially had merit, the Rules of Appellate Procedure gave it the ability to stay
the proceedings in the district court while it considered Logerstedt's argument.34 Indeed, Logerstedt asked for a stay of the district-court proceedings. 35 In light of this, it is unclear why the Court took the drastic step of
exercising supervisory control without first giving Dr. Taylor an opportunity to respond-an action that the Rules of Appellate Procedure do not
permit.
IV.

AN INAPPROPRIATE APPLICATION OF THE WRIT OF
SUPERVISORY CONTROL

36
It
A cardinal rule of appellate procedure is the final-judgment rule.
prohibits an appeal from an interlocutory order that determines preliminary
or subordinate issues, but is not a court's final decision on the case. 37 An
order granting partial summary judgment is specifically listed as one that is
not appealable until after final judgment. 38 Here, the district judge granted
partial summary judgment-an interlocutory ruling which Logerstedt could
not appeal until trial concluded. By granting supervisory control, the Court
allowed Logerstedt to bootstrap an interlocutory order to a petition for supervisory control and effectively bypass the final judgment rule.

Writs of supervisory control are not creatures of judicial discretion.
As a threshold matter, for the Court to assume original jurisdiction, it must
determine whether certain elements are satisfied. The Court is otherwise
without authority to assume jurisdiction to intervene in a lower court's proceedings. Writs are appropriate only when urgent or emergency factors exist that make the normal appeal process inadequate, the issue is purely legal,
and one of the following factors exists: (1) the court is proceeding under a
mistake of law and is causing a gross injustice; (2) constitutional issues of
major statewide importance are involved; or (3) the other court has granted
or denied a motion for substitution of a judge in a criminal case. 39 Thus,
the plain language of Rule 14(3) establishes a three-part test that must be
satisfied before the Court may exercise supervisory control.
34. Mont. R. App. P. 14(7)(c).
35. Application for Writ of Supervisory Control & Stay of Jury Tr., Logerstedt v. Taylor at 8-9.

36. Mont. R. App. P. 6(1).
37. Mont. R. App. P. 6(5)(f); Mont. R. App. P. 4(l)(b).
38. Mont. R. App. P. 6(5)(b).
39. Mont. R. App. P. 14(3) (emphasis added).
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In Logerstedt, the Court assumed jurisdiction, but it did so without
specifically establishing even one of the requisite factors. Acknowledging
the writ of supervisory control as an extraordinary remedy, the Court said:
This Court is reluctant to grant writs of supervisory control, which are extraordinary writs, and especially reluctant to do so before ordering a response
from the Respondent district court and the opposing party in the underlying
litigation. However, after carefully reviewing the petition and supporting
documents, we deem that it is appropriate in this singularinstance to grant the
writ of supervisory control, in part.
Under the unique circumstances presented by this case, we conclude that the
requirements of M.R.App.P. 14(2)(a) have been met and deem it appropriate
to order the portions of the District Court's order on summary judgment
which dismiss Logerstedt's claim for punitive damages and prohibits testi40
mony concerning punitive damages be vacated.

This statement raises more questions than it answers. What legal issue
in Logerstedt did the Court deem significant enough to justify making an
exception in this "singular" instance? And what "unique circumstances"
existed? Logerstedt presented no extraordinary circumstances, and the Supreme Court's order mentions none. Nothing about this ordinary medical
malpractice claim or the district court's issuance of an order for partial summary judgment satisfied the requisite elements for a writ. The district
court's order was not based on a mistake of law that caused gross injustice.
Likewise, Logerstedt did not involve constitutional issues of statewide importance, nor did the facts establish any sort of urgent or emergency situation. So, why did the Supreme Court allow Logerstedt to bypass the appeals process in this case, when other litigants faced with unfavorable interlocutory rulings must abide by the rules and appeal after conclusion of the
district court proceedings?
Reference to Logerstedt's Petition does not provide any assistance in
discovering what unique circumstances caused the Supreme Court to grant
supervisory control. Logerstedt's Petition did not discuss the factors for
granting supervisory control. Rather, the sole focus of Logerstedt's argument was that the district court had erroneously granted partial summary
judgment on punitive damages, a claim for which Logerstedt had an adequate remedy on appeal. The entirety of Logerstedt's attempt to satisfy the
Rule 14(3) factors was this statement: "If a writ of supervisory control is
not granted a gross injustice to Logerstedt will occur."'4 1 Logerstedt did not
expound on this claim until his conclusion when he stated:
40. Or., Logerstedt v. Dist. Ct. of the 4th Jud. Dist. at 1-2 (emphasis added). The Court's citation
to Rule 14(2)(a) instead of Rule 14(3)(a) appears to be a typographical error.
41. Application for Writ of Supervisory Control & Stay of Jury Tr., Logerstedt v. Taylor at 2.
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It will be a waste of time and money, not just to Logerstedt, but for Taylor
and the taxpayers of Missoula County to hold a trial and then have the outcome later reversed on appeal for these clear legal mistakes contained in the
District Court's Orders, which are the subject of this Application and Motion
to Stay.

42

Thus, Logerstedt merely contended that supervisory control was necessary because he would otherwise incur expenses. He made no effort to
establish that he did not have an adequate remedy on appeal, nor did he
attempt to establish the other requirements set forth in Rule 14(3). Despite
these failures, the Court granted his petition and exercised supervisory control.
Regardless of the merits of his position, Logerstedt did not establish
that his situation was different from that of any party in any other case who
failed to prevail on a pretrial motion. Logerstedt's case for supervisory
control rested entirely on his claim that granting supervisory control was
necessary to avoid the expense associated with a trial and appeal. However,
the mere fact that a subsequent appeal may result in reversal and retrial
cannot justify exercising the extraordinary remedy of supervisory control.
If that is the standard, supervisory control would be appropriate any time a
district court granted or denied a motion for partial summary judgment or a
motion excluding evidence, as reversal of the decision on appeal could result in a retrial that would cause the parties to incur significant expenses. In
essence, a procedure meant to be an extraordinary remedy would become
the ordinary remedy, and the exception would become the rule.
The Supreme Court's action in Logerstedt becomes even more convoluted when considering that less than one month earlier, the Court refused
to grant supervisory control when a nearly identical argument was raised.
In Stevens v. Montana Fourth Judicial District Court, Stevens sought supervisory control after the district court denied her motion to amend her
complaint to include a claim for punitive damages. 43 Stevens argued that
"if she prevails at trial on the issue of liability and then on appeal from the
trial court's denial of her motion to amend, then she will be forced to retry
her entire case to a second jury on the issue of punitive damages, at a great
cost and waste of time and resources." 44 The Court denied Stevens' Petition after concluding: "The discretionary decision of the District Court to
deny the motion to amend the complaint is not a mistake of law which

42. Id. at 8-9.
43. Or., Stevens v. 4th Jud. Dist. Ct. (Mont. Oct. 7, 2009) (No. OP 09-0527) (available at Mont.
Sup. Ct. Pub. View Docket, http://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov, select Closed Case Search, search by
case number OP 09-0527).
44. Id. at 2.
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moves the Appellate Court to grant extraordinary relief, and we are not
'45
persuaded that Stevens is without an adequate remedy on appeal.
Thus, less than one month before it exercised supervisory control in
Logerstedt, the Supreme Court had concluded that the expenses associated
with a trial, appeal, and potential retrial did not render Steven's remedy on
appeal inadequate. Why the Supreme Court decided Stevens and Logerstedt
differently is a mystery. Suffice it to say, however, inconsistent decisions
such as these leave attorneys in Montana bewildered as to when supervisory
control is appropriate and are likely to increase the number of petitions the
Court must consider.
Improper application of the writ in Logerstedt recalls former Chief
Justice Gray's warnings about the needless expansive use of the writ. In
Lane v. Montana Fourth Judicial District Court,46 the issue before the
Court on an application for writ was res judicata.47 Lane claimed he was
forced to re-defend against a claim previously settled in another district
court. 48 The Court agreed with Lane and vacated the district court's denial
of summary judgment order. 4 9 Chief Justice Gray argued in her dissent that
issuing a writ was inappropriate because the district court had caused no
gross injustice and Lane had an adequate remedy on appeal. 50 She declared
that such expansive application of the writ is problematic and renders the
notion of "gross injustice" meaningless:
A "gross injustice" apparently now means only an erroneous-or potentially
erroneous-ruling or an alleged pretrial abuse of discretion which, if not corrected by this Court's intervention, will permit the proceedings in the trial
court to proceed in their normal course with their associated delays and expenses. In the future, will any rational attorney refrain from petitioning for
supervisory control on any non-appealable ruling at any stage in trial court
proceedings? On what grounds will the Court ever find reason to deny supervisory control? And how in the world does such an approach comport with
either the trial court's general authority to control
the proceedings before
51
them or our primary role as an appellate court?

In light of the Court's action in Logerstedt, it appears Chief Justice Gray's
warning has had little effect.

45. Id. (emphasis added).
46. Lane v. Mont. 4th Jud. Dist. Ct., 68 P.3d 819 (Mont. 2003) (Gray, C.J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 822.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id.
Id. at 825.
Id.
Id. at 826.
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CONCLUDING REMARKS

It is axiomatic that due process is essential to a just legal system. As
the United States Supreme Court has stated, "[t]he fundamental requisite of
due process of law is the opportunity to be heard." 5 2 To reach its result in
Logerstedt, the Montana Supreme Court undermined this basic premise by
not allowing Dr. Taylor an opportunity to respond in the writ proceedings, a
clear violation of the procedural protocols required under Appellate Rule of
Procedure 14(7). The Montana Supreme Court is known for demanding
strict adherence to its Rules of Appellate Procedure, and it routinely sanctions violations. 53 Yet in this case, it was the Court that violated its own
rules, leaving Dr. Taylor with no recourse and no option to appeal.

52. Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914).
53. See e.g Yetter v. Kennedy, 571 P.2d 1152, 1156 (Mont. 1997) (failure to follow Rules 9(b) and
10(a) and transmit a lower court transcript to the Supreme Court demonstrates "a complete lack of
adherence to the Montana Rules of Appellate Procedure" leaving the Court "unable to decide the issues"); In re Appeals Improperly Certifiedas FinalJudm. Entered Pursuantto Mont. R. Civ. P. 54(b),
178 P.3d 694, 695 (Mont. 2007) (chiding parties for filing appeals or cross appeals prior to obtaining
final judgment certification from the district court); Roy v. Neibauer,610 P.2d 1185, 1187 (Mont. 1980)
(dismissing for failure to satisfy certification rules).
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